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111431Z Jul 05

ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	CIAE-00	INL-00	PERC-00
	DS-00	EAP-00	EUR-00	VC-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	CAC-00	VCE-00	NRC-00	NSAE-00	OES-00
	OIC-00	PA-00	MCC-00	GIWI-00	SGAC-00	FMPC-00	SP-00
	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	EVR-00	R-00	SCRS-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/001W

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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8553
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000949

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/S NEWMAN, DAS WOODS; OVP FOR
NULAND; NSC FOR ABRAMS, COURVILLE; AID FOR PIERSON AND
COPSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [ZI](#)

SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL ENVOY BRIEFS ON MISSION RESULTS:
CRITICA OF GOZ BUT CALLS FOR 'CONDITIONED' ASSISTANCE AND
ARGES FOR ENGAGEMENT

Classified By: CDA Eric Schult for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary

1. (C) UN Special Envoy Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka briefed the donor community July 8 on the results of her visit. In a sop to the GOZ, she called Operation Restore Order &well-intentioned,8 but was nonetheless highly critical of its underlying assumption that urbanization could be reversed and of the wide scale suffering it had caused. Tibaijuka encouraged the donor community to assist its victims. However, anticipating donor questions and concerns she agreed the assistance could not be unconditional. The government would have to agree to end the operation, facilitate assistance, and allocate urban plots of land (&stands8) on which people could receive assistance and eventually rebuild. In a private conversation afterwards, one of her aides told CDA that the report to the Secretary General would be openly critical of the GOZ but would be written with a bias toward engagement as the best way to help the victims. End Summary.

&Well-Intentioned8 but Abusive Operation

2. (C) Tibaijuka said she had met with President Mugabe and a &number8 of Ministers earlier that day, which she described as yet another indication of the seriousness with which the GOZ took her visit. She noted for the record that she had deliberately strayed from her schedule and had not been obstructed in doing so. (N.B. We know from other sources that the GOZ tried to restrict what she saw but gave up after a few days because the wide-scale of the destruction made it impossible to hide fully.) She added that Zimbabwe was &relatively stable,8 which the international community should see as an important asset, but that the operation had caused widespread anger, which could turn to anger and undermine that stability.

3. (C) Tibaijuka said there were considerable assistance needs in Zimbabwe as a result of Operation Restore Order, which she described as &well-intentioned8 but which had caused a &lot of problems.8 Part of her mandate as head of UN-Habitat was to eliminate or upgrade slums, which had been the operation,s stated purpose. The problem in Zimbabwe was that homes had been destroyed not because they were slums -- most would not have fit the technical definition -- but because they were illegal. The GOZ,s strict adherence to the law had led to indiscriminate destruction.

4. (C) In addition, Tibaijuka said the GOZ had unrealistically expected people to return to their rural

&homes.8 As an African who had grown up in a village and moved to the city (Dar es Salaam), she had tried to convince the government that urbanization in Africa was irreversible, at least for a government not willing to use force. Thirty percent of the displaced people had moved to the countryside but the rest had stayed in urban and peri-urban areas. Many of these were sleeping in the open. Particularly problematic were second and third generation Zimbabweans of Malawian or Mozambiquan roots, who had no rural &home8 to return to.

15. (C) Tibaijuka said the GOZ had committed many errors in conduct of the operation. The sheer scale had been among the most egregious: more than 130,000 households and well over 500,000 people had been affected. This had overwhelmed the country,s capacity to cope with the human suffering the operation had caused. In addition, the methodology had also been a significant problem: the overzealous police and the military had destroyed homes and businesses without consulting local authorities. In many instances, they had destroyed legal structures.

Donor,s Role and Concerns

16. (C) Tibaijuka thanked the donor countries for their assistance to Zimbabwe and Africa, especially food aid and HIV/AIDs assistance. She hoped the donors would once more assist Zimbabweans in need, adding however that it should be done on the basis of &positive conditionality,8 by which she meant the government should be encouraged to allocate &stands8 or small plots of land to the displaced in urban areas and to change its laws to facilitate the building of permanent structures on the stands. To that end, she intended to establish a permanent UN-Habitat office in Harare as part of the UN Mission.

17. (C) The donor community responded to this appeal with a number of questions and concerns, which reflected their frustration with the situation, and their skepticism of the government,s true motivations and future plans. The Australian Ambassador challenged Tibaijuka,s description of the operation as &well-intentioned.8 Tibaijuka responded that there were many theories on why the GOZ had chosen to undertake the operation at this time and that she would include those details in her report to Secretary Annan. She had, however, deliberately chosen to emphasize the urban renewal aspects of her mission as an &access8 point with the government.

18. (C) The CDA noted the moral hazard implied by providing assistance while the operation was on-going and asked if she had received any assurances it would stop. Tibaijuka said she had not and acknowledged that the operation was still ongoing. She called ending the operation an appropriate condition for providing assistance and added that she genuinely believed that Mugabe had been ignorant of the scale of the destruction before her visit. UNDP Resrep Zacharias noted in that regard that he planned to meet with GOZ Ministers the fooling week to press for its end.

19. (C) The Canadian representative noted there was also a moral hazard in assisting Zimbabwe with reconstruction following what was in effect a man-made disaster. Tibaijuka responded that the immediate need was for tents and other temporary shelters, rather than reconstruction, which would best be supplied to people living on the stands on which they would eventually build (or rebuild). The EU Representative and the Acting USAID Director expressed skepticism that the government would move quickly to resettle people and noted its propensity for political favoritism in dispensing aid. Tibaijuka said another condition should be that the NGO communities distribute the assistance and that they do so in a non-partisan manner.

110. (C) Finally, the French Ambassador noted his personal disquiet that no one in the government had expressed either public or private regret over the operation or shown any awareness of the scale of suffering. Tibaijuka responded that deep down she believed many in the GOZ realized that a mistake had been made, otherwise why else would they have spent so much time trying to justify themselves. However, she acknowledged that no one in the GOZ had expressed regret to her either.

Tibaijuka Aide Report; Need for Engagement

111. (C) CDA met privately with Tibaijuka,s principal political aide, Nicholas Yu, following the briefing. You said from the UN team,s perspective they had accomplished three things. First, the team had established that human right violations had occurred. You said GOZ had clearly failed to follow accepted international practices, and even its own laws, with respect to forced evictions, which the

report would make clear. Second, the GOZ had realized that its attempts to &spin8 the facts otherwise were not working. Finally, the government,s critics in the opposition and civil society had similarly realized that they had to report accurately -- the UN had caught them exaggerating on several occasions.

¶12. (C) You said the report to the Secretary General would not be written in &UN-speak8 but would be written with a

bias toward engagement. He described Mugabe and the GOZ as &cornered rats,8 who would continue to lash out at the people of Zimbabwe unless given a way to escape from a mess of their own making. To that end, it was useful to describe the operation as something that had started out as an urban &clean-up8 meant to please Mugabe and which had spun out of control as various other actors had jumped on board with their own agendas. That said, the UN team,s bottom-line was that the operation had been both stupid and mean and would ultimately be unsuccessful -- people would eventually return to urban areas and rebuild, only this time the slums would look even worse.

Comment

¶13. (C) Tibaijuka and her team decided early on to take the GOZ's intentions with respect to Operation Restore Order at face value; in effect to concentrate on how and not why. To that end, she has been critical both in private and public of the operation's excesses, but has avoided a blanket condemnation or any public discussion of GOZ motives. It remains to be seen what this approach will accomplish. It has so far failed to end the operation or to assist in any meaningful way its victims. On the whole, however, and despite GOZ attempts to twist the visit to suit its purposes, it does seem to have helped substantiate international criticism and put the GOZ on the defensive, even within Africa and with its own citizens. The next steps are in New York. If the report is genuinely critical and if the Secretary General uses it appropriately, it could put a lot of added pressure on the regime and its apologists - especially in South Africa.
SCHULTZ

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